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When
Soldiers
Are Defendants
In whose court do they belong?
The Solorio decision changes the rules

hile celebrating at a local bar located outside
L
j Fort Blank, Sergeant
Smith is involved in a
W
fight that leaves two
civilians badly beaten.
Smith is arrested and taken to the
local civilian jail. He retains a local
civilian attorney who calls the district attorney with the question,
"Who is going to prosecute my
client?" A year ago the answer
would probably have been: "the local DA." Now, the answer is not so
simple. In Solorio v. United States,
107 S.Ct 2924 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court expanded courtmartial subject matter jurisdiction
and made prosecution by military
authorities a viable alternative for
otherwise "civilian" offenses.
l

i

On its face, the Solorio decision
is of little, if any, interest to civilian
practitioners in criminal justice. The

ramifications of this major shift in ju-

risdiction, however, will no doubt be
felt not only by military prosecutors,
but also civilian prosecutors, defense counsel, and investigative
agencies. Although it is early to assess the full impact of this decision,
a number of local prosecutors and
defense counsel have already begun to realize its practical implications.
Limits on military jurisdiction
In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled
that the military's jurisdiction was
limited to those offenses which were

"service-connected." In O'Callahan,
the accused had been tried by courtmartial for various offenses arising out
of his attempted rape of a young civilian girl in a Honolulu hotel while
on leave. Writing for a majority of five
members, Justice Douglas noted an
historical distrust for military jurisdiction and that it should therefore be
limited to the least extent necessary,
i.e., those offenses which are service
connected. The underlying constitutional rationale for this limitation
was that military criminal trials did not
provide the traditional Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand
jury and the Sixth Amendment right
to a trial by jury. The charged offenses, said the Court, were of the type
typically prosecuted in civilian courts
and the civilian courts were open and
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operating. In dissent, Justice Harlan
predicted that "infinite permutations
of possibly relevant factors are bound
to create confusion and proliferate
litigation over the [court-martial] jurisdiction issue." 395 U.S. at 284. His
observation was prophetic.
Faced with some of these permutations, the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of military subject matter jurisdiction in Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971),
and still later in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975). In Relford, the Court listed 21 factors that
should be considered in determining whether a particular offense was
"service connected" and therefore
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the military courts. But, four
years later in Schlesinger, the Court
seemed to abandon the 21-factor
test and indicated that service connection was largely gauged by balancing military and civilian interests
in the prosecution of the offense.
These decisions did little to settle
the often hotly contested issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. In the
intervening years the military courts
themselves shifted positions from a
liberal reading of the service connection requirement, to a strict
reading, and most recently back to
a broader perspective. These shifts
were most apparent in drug related
cases, where the Court of Military
Appeals finally held that virtually
every drug offense committed by
servicemembers, whether committed on or off a military installation,
would fall within the subject matter
jurisdiction of military courts. United
States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A.
1980).
Although no recent hard data has
been collected, it has been generally
assumed that many minor offenses
committed by servicemembers in the
civilian community were never prosecuted. In some instances, civilian
prosecutors simply were unable, or
unwilling, due to budget or time
constraints, to actively pursue prosecution of military offenders. On the
David A. Schlueter is Associate Dean
and Professor of Law at St. Mary's
University in San Antonio, Texas.
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other hand, if the military decided to
prosecute, under military case law
the military prosecutor was required
to allege and prove the service connection requirement in every offense. Frequently, either the trial or
appellate courts would conclude that
no subject matter jurisdiction existed. Needless to say, many viewed
the service connection requirement
as a troublesome barrier, based
largely on a distrust of a justice system that had since matured and generally paralleled federal criminal
practice.
Service connection
no longer required
The service connection requirement was finally abandoned and
O'Callahan overruled in Solorio v.
United States, 107 S.Ct. 2924 (1987).
While assigned to a Coast Guard
unit in Juneau, Alaska, the accused
committed numerous acts of sexual
abuse against two minor daughters
of other Coast Guard members. The
crimes were not discovered, however, until after he had been transferred to Governors Island, New
York, where he committed additional acts of sexual abuse on other
daughters of Coast Guardsmen. On
a defense motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, the military judge
concluded that the Alaska offenses
were not service connected, but the
New York offenses were since they
had been committed in government quarters. On a government
appeal of that ruling, the Coast
Guard Court of Military Review held
that there was sufficient service
connection over the Alaska offenses. 21 M.J. 512 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985).
The United States Court of Military
Appeals affirmed, noting that "sex
offenses against young children ... have a continuing effect on

the victims and their families and ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization to which the
family member isassigned." 21 M.J.
251, 256 (C.M.A. 1986). The court
also considered the benefits to both
the accused and the government
from trying the Alaska and New York
offenses at the same trial, the adverse impact of returning some of

the victims to Alaska to testify at any
civilian trial, and the civilian prosecutor's interest in trying the accused.
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for
five members of the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that jurisdiction of a court-martial depends
solely on the defendant's status as a
member of the armed forces, not
service connection. In overruling
O'Callahan, the Court noted that the
case had departed from the longstanding precedent that status of the
accused as a servicemember was the
key, and that the historical reasoning in O'Callahan for limiting jurisdiction was based upon a less-thanaccurate reading of history. Instead,
said the Court, there was overwhelming support of Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan that the
plain language in Article 1, §8, cI 14
gave Congress plenary power to determine the extent of military jurisdiction. Comparing that power to
Congress' broad commerce clause
powers, the Court noted that in military affairs it has deferred to Congress in a variety of contexts where
the individual constitutional rights
of servicemembers were implicated. See, e.g. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. - (1986) (military
restriction on servicemember's free
exercise of religion); Rosker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (restriction
on assignments for female servicemembers).
In dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's historical
analysis and noted that it had completely ignored the underlying rationale of O'Callahan-thatcourtsmartial deny servicemembers the
rights to indictment by grand jury
and a jury trial. Justice Marshall recognized that application of the Relford factors was difficult, timeconsuming and required narrow
lines, but that it was necessary because "[t]he trial of any person before a court-martial encompasses a
deliberate decision to withhold procedural protections guaranteed by
the Constitution." 107 S.Ct at 2941.
In applying the Relford factors to this
case, Justice Marshall concluded
that there was no service connec-
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tion over the off-base Alaska offenses. Finally, he noted that the
majority's abandonment of the
service connection requirement reflected "contempt, both for the
members of our armed forces and
for the constitutional safeguards intended to protect us all." 107 S.Ct
at 2941.
Constitutional implications
In abandoning the service connection requirement, the Court has
certainly simplified the process of
determining whether a court-martial
has jurisdiction over the offense.
Now, virtually every "civilian" offense may be tried in a military court
if the defendant has military "status." This assumes that Congress will
not otherwise limit such jurisdiction
by indicating that certain offenses
are not triable in courts-martial. To
date, the legislative trend has been
to add to the list of those offenses
which are cognizable in military
courts. For example, in 1986, the
court added the offense of espionage to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Article 106a, U.C.M.J.,
10 U.S.C. 906a. Even absent specific legislative changes, Article 134
of the U.C.M.J. (the general article)
is usually available as a source for
prosecution of "civilian" offenses
which have not otherwise been
written into the U.C.M.J. Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
It is important to note that in Solorio the Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of any
particular aspect of the court-martial
process. Although it might be argued that the Court implicity blessed
this worldwide system of criminal
justice, it is probably safer to conclude that the Court only decided
the narrower question of whether
the service connection requirement
was constitutionally required. That
means that various aspects of the
military criminal system are still subject to constitutional scrutiny. Given
the Court's recent deferential review of congressional actions in this
area, it seems doubtful that the
Court would dismantle parts of the
system-as long as Congress had
any rational basis for determining
Spring 1988

that a particular procedural protection otherwise available in civilian
trials was not feasible in military
practice.
Finally, the full impact of Solorio
may reach beyond subject matter
jurisdiction questions. For example,
its reaffirmation of Congress' virtually unlimited powers in determining what offenses are triable in
military courts might be extended
to its determinations of who is subject to military criminal prosecution.
This would be particularly important in assessing the constitutionality of U.C.M.J. provisions which
attempt to extend jurisdictions over
civilian employees, discharged servicemembers and reservists. In the
past those provisions were read narrowly by the Court because of the
same constitutional rationale which
undergirded the service connection
rule-the lack of grand jury indictment and jury trial. See, e.g., Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (no jurisdiction over discharged servicemember for offenses committed
while on active duty).
Ironically, just months before the
court decided Solorio, Congress
amended Articles 2 and 3 of the
U.C.M.J. to permit the government
to order a reservist to active duty for
purpose of nonjudicial punishment,
an Article 32 Investigation (a procedure similar in function to the grand
jury), or a court-martial. Further, termination of a period of active duty
or inactive duty for training (i.e.,
weekend drills) will not terminate jurisdiction over the reservist. In light
of Solorio, these most recent legislative expansions of jurisdiction will
probably withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Although this statutory
change is not as dramatic as the impact of Solorio, it nonetheless demonstrates a trend to expand courtmartial jurisdiction. And that, in turn,
will affect how civilian prosecutors
and defense attorneys approach
cases involving servicemembers who
have committed offenses in the civilian community.
Solorio in practice
The Solorio decision expands the
concurrent jurisdiction between

both the military and the state and
federal authorities which in many
instances is already reflected in current formal or informal agreements.
Those agreements should now be
reviewed and assessed in light of
Solorio. Rather than establishing
standardized agreements on a nationwide basis, the armed services
have generally permitted individual
military installations or commands
to negotiate such agreements with
local prosecutors. One county prosecutor, for instance, in reponse to
Solorio is now holding weekly
meetings with a military prosecutor
from a nearby major Army installation to determine responsibility for
prosecuting servicemembers who
have committed offenses in the civilian community.
When there is concurrent jurisdiction in both civilian and military
courts, the issue of priority of prosecution islargely a question of comity. As one might imagine, the
negotiations between state, federal,
and military prosecutors about
where a particular case should be
tried may become a delicate matter.
Military prosecutors may become
concerned that even with the expansion of military jurisdiction, they
will only inherit those cases which
are considered by civilian prosecutors to be "losers" or otherwise insignificant. Civilian prosecutors, on
the other hand, who are accountable to a civilian populace are generally not anxious to relinquish
control over major cases which have
the public's eye. Although the defendant cannot choose which forum
will try him, defense counsel could
theoretically affect the question of
forum through attractive offers of
plea bargaining in one forum or the
other. Thus, in some instances an
alert defense attorney can influence
the question of where a particular
servicemember will be prosecuted.
This means of course that civilian
counsel will have to acquire some
working knowledge of military justice procedures or policies.
In deciding the issue of forum, it
is especially incumbent upon civilian and military prosecutors to con(Continued on page 36)
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defendants may provide information exposing the defendant to a
higher guideline range sentence
than was faced based on the information known to the government at
the time the deal was struck. A defendant who inculpates himself, cooperates for a time, and then backs
out or is unable to deliver the cooperation sought by the government, faces the greatest danger of
significantly increased exposure.
This situation is comparable to the
defendant who has no one to cooperate against, but who participated in more substantial or additional
criminal conduct beyond that
known to the government at the
agreement stage.
Under such circumstances, what
is the incentive to a defendant to reveal additional facts? What protection does a defendant have against
increasing the exposure faced, other than the normal protections
against proffered information being
used directly to incriminate? Could
an agreement be structured so that
the additional incriminating information is only revealed in the proffer context, unless it is needed to
manifest cooperation? How can a
plea agreement be structured that

allows for subsequent inclusion of
information relevant to guideline
application that is not known at the
time of the plea agreement, such as
the applicability of specific offense
characteristics or adjustments, the
Criminal History calculation, or the
applicability of the career offender
or criminal livelihood provisions?
The nature and structure of plea
agreements may have to be modified to retain incentives to plead
guilty, to reveal all facts of criminal
wrongdoing, and to cooperate
without risking exposure to added
penalties. Towards this end, agreements may have to be structured
that accomplish the following: leave
for subsequent resolution disputed
or undetermined factors or information; establish a limitation on exposure given known facts or
specified unknown ones (possibly
through a cap or agreement on the
offense level or guideline range); allow a specific sentence bargain; or
agree to the applicability of certain
enhancements or adjustments based
on undisputed sentencing facts.
Obviously, the parties may want
to attempt to have some or all of the
presentence report completed before the plea agreement. Any incen-

tives relevant to an agreement may
often be more effectively structured. At the conclusion of the
guideline application process, the
judge can choose a point within the
range, giving reasons for this choice
only if the maximum exceeds the
minimum by 24 months, or otherwise departs from the range.
Throughout the calculation of the
appropriate guideline range, relevant factors, which were not adequately considered during the
calculations and are not explicitly
excluded from consideration by the
guidelines, may be evaluated by the
judge.
Ultimately, the guidelines must be
applied, and relevant issues litigated, in light of the sentencing goals
expressed by the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984: deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment,
and rehabilitating the offender.
Practitioners face a new system of
guideline sentencing that purports
to be more rational, structured and
orderly than prior law. Survival under the system will require a thorough knowledge of the changed
system before traditional litigation
skills may be effectively used. CJ

to 934, and apply without regard to
where the offense was committed.
Thus, in the opening scenario, Sergeant Smith could be prosecuted in
a military court for the typical assault offenses or for a variety of other
offenses related to disorderly conduct and public intoxication as a violation of Article 134-the General
Article. If there is no specific punitive article proscribing the offense,
Article 134 permits the military to
prosecute a servicemember for
noncapital federal crimes and offenses. That same provision would
permit prosecution for a state offense under the Assimilative Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. §13, if the charged
offense occurred at a location within
the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and if there

were no federal statute preempting
application of the state provision.
Williams v. United States, 327 U.S.
711 (1946). Article 134 could also
serve as a basis of prosecuting a state
crime which either is to the prejudice of good order and discipline of
the armed services or is conduct
which brings discredit upon the
armed forces. Again, this assumes
that no punitive article in the
U.C.M.1. already proscribes the
same conduct. See e.g., United States
v. Irvin, 21 M.J. 184 (C.M.A. 1986)
(discussion of applicability of various provisions of Article 134 to state
statute covering child abuse). In
short, in many instances a military
prosecution may provide the prosecutor with a broader range of
choices from the military, federal, or

(Continued from page 17)
sider a variety of substantive,
procedural and evidentiary factors
which may make it more feasible or
advantageous to prosecute in a military proceeding. It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to
compare civilian and military criminal trials in depth. But the point can
be made by briefly discussing several key procedural and evidentiary
rules.
Substantive considerations
In assessing the feasibility of a
military prosecution it is important
to note that almost all of the common law offenses are proscribed
under the punitive articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Articles 77 to 134; 10 U.S.C. §§ 877

136

Criminal Justice

state penal codes.
It is also important to consider the
differences in both the sentence
limitations and probable sentence
in the military and civilian courts.
While it would be incorrect to assume that a sentence imposed by a
court-martial would always be
heavier than that imposed in a civilian court, certain conduct in the
military is likely to result in a heavier
sentence. For example, drug offenses almost always result in at least
nonjudicial punishment, infra, and
in some military commands, any
drug use or possession, including
marijuana, results in criminal
charges. See generally United States
v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980)
(discussion of the serious threat
posed by drug use in the military).
For the sake of comparison, wrongful use of marijuana (less than 30
grams) could result in a maximum
punishment of a dishonorable discharge and confinement for two
years. If more than 30 grams of marijuana is involved, the maximum
permissible confinement is increased to five years.
Procedural considerations
A contemporary court-martial
closely approximates procedures
used in federal criminal trials. In
1984, the President of the United
States promulgated an updated
Manual for Courts-Martial which
now sets out "Rules for CourtsMartial" (R.C.M.). The terminology
may seem foreign, but those familiar with the system will attest to the
fact that it is an efficient and wellrun worldwide system of criminal
justice. Cook, "Courts-Martial: The
Third System in American Criminal
Law," 1978 S. III. U. L.]. 1.
To the extent that timeliness is a
consideration in deciding who
should prosecute a servicemember,
it should be noted that the military
criminal justice system generally
processes cases in a short period of
time because the requirements of
military readiness and operations
can ill afford long and drawn-out
proceedings. The requirement of
expeditious handling of military
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charges is exemplified in speedy trial
rules.
Like the federal system and most
jurisdictions, military prosecutors are
bound by several speedy trial rules
which may be triggered not only by
Sixth Amendment rules, see Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but
also by statutory and executive directives. For example, under the
1984 Manual for Courts-Martial,
servicemembers must be tried with
120 days of the date that charges
are proferred. More stringent rules
apply if the servicemember has
been placed in pretrial confinement.
A second important procedural
consideration involves discovery
and production of witnesses. The
military has very broad discovery
rules that provide for not only liberal discovery by the defense, but
also reciprocal discovery by the
prosecution and notice by the defense of the insanity and alibi defenses. The 1984 Manual for CourtsMartial also contains a reverse Jencks
Act disclosure requirement. The
Jencks Act requires disclosure of
pretrial statements made by a prosecution witness after that witness
has testified. 18 U.S.C. 3500. The
military rule on the other hand requires disclosure of previous statements made by both prosecution
and defense witnesses. R.C.M. 914.
This obviously presents an additional avenue of prosecution discovery not otherwise found in many
jurisdictions.
Many military prosecutions result
in some type of negotiated plea
agreement which is later subjected
to close scrutiny at the time the defendant enters his plea of guilty before the military judge. The military
courts have recognized the value of
negotiated pleas, and in recent
years, have permitted the defendant greater leeway in striking a plea
bargain with the government. For
example, a common provision in a
military pretrial agreement is the defendant's waiver of various suppression motions. For the defendant's
part, the most common benefit bargained for is a reduced sentence.
And, where a victim has suffered

monetary losses, a plea agreement
might include the defendant's
promise to make restitution.
It is important to emphasize that
not all offenses, whether committed
in the civilian or military community, necessarily result in a trial. Minor offenses, for example, are most
often dealt with through nonjudicial
punishment imposed by the servicemember's commander. See Article 15, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. 815.
However, unless the servicemember is assigned to a vessel, he has
the right to refuse such punishment
and demand a trial by court-martial.
Because of that right to demand trial,
in the past many commanders refrained from offering nonjudicial
punishment for minor offenses
committed in the civilian community unless there was some service
connection which would, if necessary, support a trial if one was demanded. Now that the service
connection requirement has been
abrogated, it seems likely that more
minor offenses committed within
the civilian community will result in
nonjudicial punishment.
Repeated acts of misconduct may
warrant one of several types of administrative discharge from the
armed services. Indeed, one ground
for an administrative discharge is
that the servicemember has been
convicted in a civilian court of a felony offense.
Finally, although principles of
double jeopardy will bar trials for the
same offense in both a federal court
and a military court, because they are
of the same sovereign, Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959),
in theory a servicemember may be
prosecuted for the same offense in
both a state and military court. However, the armed services generally
discourage such double punishment
and a successful prosecution of a
servicemember in state proceedings
will normally preclude further military prosecution. See, e.g., Army Reg.
27-10, Chapter 4. But failure to follow those regulations will probably
not be considered jurisdictional error. United States v. Stallard, 14 M.J.
933 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
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Evidence rules
In addition to examining military
criminal procedural rules, civilian
prosecutors should weigh military
evidentiary rules which may make it
more likely that the court will consider certain evidence. Again, only
selected evidentiary rules are discussed here to make the point that
sometimes a difference in the military rules may be important to consider in determining who will try a
servicemember.
Like many of the procedural rules
of courts-martial, the military evidentiary rules closely parallel the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Since
1980, the admissibility of evidence
in military criminal trials has been
governed by the Military Rules of
Evidence. Many of those rules are
verbatim renditions of the federal
counterpart with two major exceptions. First, instead of setting out
rules regarding presumptions in
what is Article Ili of the Federal
Rules, the military counterpart includes detailed rules governing the
admissibility of evidence resulting
from search and seizures, statements by the accused, and eyewitness identification. Second, the
Military Rules of Evidence, unlike
the federal version, delineate detailed rules governing evidentiary
privileges.

Despite the similarity with the
federal rules, there are key differences which may be important factors in deciding who should
prosecute a servicemember. For example, Military Rule of Evidence
803(6) specifically treats laboratory
reports and other law enforcement
instruments as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. United States v.
Holmes, 23 M.J. 565 (A.C.M.R. 1986)
(laboratory report). And Military Rule
of Evidence 803(8) also permits introduction of similar instruments.
The federal rules contain no such
specific exceptions and federal case
law generally blocks the admissibility of those documents. See generally, United Stated v. Oates, 560 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1977).
Like the federal evidentiary rules,
the Military Rules of Evidence also
contain a residual hearsay exception in Rules 803(24) and 804(5).
Those provisions have been used in
child abuse cases where the child
victim has made statements implicating the servicemember-parent. In
United States v. Rousseau, 21 M.J.
960 (A.C.M.R. 1986), the court
noted that "military society has a
compelling interest in protecting the
welfare of a soldier's family. For that
reason, the residual exceptions are
particularly well suited to [the hearsay problems arising in intrafamily
offenses]."

Multiple Defendants
(Continued from page 9)
may be willing to stipulate to such
matters to enable a particular defendant to receive a less severe sentence in return for a guilty plea. Even
more important, codefendants' sentences vary dramatically under the
guidelines depending on whether
they are characterized as an "organizer," a "supervisor," a "minimal
participant" or a "minor participant" in the criminal activity. This
itself creates a likely conflict of interest for counsel representing codefendants, who must make a case
for a particular client's lesser culpa-
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bility, thereby exposing another
client to the obvious conclusion that
he was the "organizer" or "supervisor."
In addition to the many factual
determinations that differentiate
codefendants under the sentencing
guidelines, judges are given discretion to depart from the guidelines
when they find "aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind, or
to a degree, that was not adequately
taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. §

The Supreme Court's decision in
Solorio v. United States is significant
for several reasons. First, by abandoning the O'Callahan service connection requirement for determining
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court
has signaled a growing deference for
Congress' decisions on what offenses may be prosecuted in the
military criminal justice system. It
also presents new options for both
civilian and military prosecutors. In
effect, the decision creates concurrent jurisdiction between military
and civilian prosecutors over servicemembers who have committed
offenses in the civilian community.
For the civilian prosecutor this
means that in deciding whether to
proceed with criminal charges
against a servicemember a number
of procedural and evidentiary factors should be considered. In any
given case, one or more of these
factors may make military prosecution under Solorio a viable alternative.
If a servicemember ends up'being
tried in a military court, defense
counsel may find him or herself
working within the military criminal
justice system.
Thus, for both prosecutors and
defense counsel, the Supreme
Court's decision in Solorio is bound
to affect civilian criminal justice in
many jurisdictions-especially those
in proximity to military installations.

tit
3553 (b). Thus defense counsel may
often find it appropriate to argue that
a particular client's case is sufficiently unusual to justify a departure. An attorney making such an
argument must not be constrained
in saying that the defendant in
question is worthy of different treatment from similarly situated defendants. For more information on the
impact of the federal sentencing
guidelines, see the article, "Better
Do Your Homework," by Donald A.
Purdy, Jr. and Michael Goldsmith on
page 2.
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